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It is not just by talking about democracy that African comtries will become 
dernmatic. We must act more and talk Icss. To build a auly d m m t i c  snciety 
and cube, we must plant the' seeds of c l e m m y ,  enable them to geminate by 
nourishing tbem and watering them rep- larly, and when the plants begin to 
emeage and grow by carehlly and tenderly nursing them until they k o m e  as 
strung as h k o  nees.' 
Adeheyo Adedeji 
AU the proMcms surfacing now are the result of intemal defects of the [Nigerian 
transition] program [and] its contradictions. That is why 1 have called it vc* 
democracy? 
WoIe Soyiaka 
It is paradoxical that a military institution that is hardy known for its 
democratic culture &odd assume the mmus task of gestation and nurturing a 
polity that is as complex as Nigeria into democratic gowmance. Perceptually, 
here probab1y lies one of the dikmmas and amtradidim that hedeviled the 
tnasitim pmcess. A d  this was a particularly frustrating and pturbinpr situation, 
given the painstaking efforts akpted by the Armed Forces Ruling Council 
(AFRC) to tm&er p w e r  to a democratically elected government in 1993. But 
again, it muld he a r g d  that Nigeria represmts a p a l i a r  case in the somewhat 
evolutionary, democratic metammphmii in the A- continent, hecawc of its 
population, culhnal characteristics and eclmpsitim d its intricate society. 
Tbe complexity of Nigeria's &moaacy hurgeuns fiurn the fact that in over 
three decades since its Mb as an independent sovereign state, the military has 
g o m e d  intermittently for twenty-two years. Thus, it could be contended that 
westem-style demoaacy has no fm roots in the amtry.  Nigeria was horn 
a sovereign natim-state after about fc#ty-six years (1914-1960) d British 
gestah.  Its political history has heen Fraught with turbulence hmught ahout, 
inter alia, by ecanmnic, social, and political m i a m m a ~ t  and It has 
bad five sttfcesful and two ufmuaxsful military coups and a cml war (1967- 
1970) to "boast" of. Fmbably, fatigued f m  military coups and the cumbersome 
burcien of governing a resilient d scvllisticated pli ty , the military rcgii 
decided to n'linquish power to demcmatically elected civilians. 
First, this study attempts to discuss briefly t k  concept of demcmacy which 
has hccomc a national shibboleth, with confusing and sometirncs conflic-bg 
interpretations. Sccond, it examines mncisely the activity of the two p d s  
sanctioned hy the AFRC to contcst thc clccqions leading to thc emergmc of h 
Third Rcphlic. In prticularly, the analysis focuses on the pkrnatorial and 
presidential ckaicwrs. 
But thc issue that has confounded many political observers is whether thc 
political elites are "genuinely" p p m d  for democratic governance, or if the 
process is going to k n m e  eilrsivc as has b n  two previous attcrnpts. 
The Concept of Democracy 
It is truc that democracy (in its various forms) tiuivd on the African continent 
bcfm thc advcot of donialism. It was also true as L. Ruhin and 8. Wcinsteio, 
havc argued that due to ethnocentricism, the colonial powas and many political 
sicntists failed to m0gniz.t this p h e m m e ~ ~ ~  bccause the African systems wen: 
not ikntical to the system in Eun~pc.~ 
For cxample, Ali M a m i  bas argued that among the Tiv socicty in pn!- and 
postalunial Nigeria, dcmcxxacy "flowered." The Tiv society had no rulers. So. 
the eI&n m t  whcn naxswy to discus village problems. In Tiv democracy. 
accountability was a central principk. Debate among them could be ficrcc as tbt 
elders talked d talkcd until thcy could reach a consemus. At the end, they tnok 
an oath to ahidt: by the daision; this gave it legitima~y.~ Also, many scho!afs 
are imtatcd, if nut indignant, when some African politicians make a "mockery" 
of democracy, given thc fact that it is not alicn to traditional Africa In fact, 
Chinua Achcbe chafed at the notion that democracy is foreign to Africans whcn 
he said: "Nobody can tell us a h u t  thc value of government hy discussioa and 
amensus. Thc African mion of democracy went far beyond wbal is practiced 
[clscwhere. 1 
In my own [ I b ]  community, ri NigeriaJ thcrc is discussion whcn thiapare 
happening. If you don't pafticipatc, it's your own fault - nobody stops you. So thc 
notion that wc arc learning something new is abs~~rd."' If this notion is plausible, 
arguably, the political adm are ~ n s i b l c  for its weakness in Nigeria, 
principally, hecausc they have faikd to adhere to thc ruka of thc game in the 
quest to pursuc their parochial interests. 
Basic to thc argurocnt king flrniKnrnded hem is that sincc democracy is not 
alien to thc Nigerian polity, its suaxss could be possible, if the lawmakers are 
committed to it. But democracy, it has hcen contended elsewhere is not 
monolithi8 and hcncc the need to concoct a gcmc that is favorahlc to the 
Nigcrian system. In his presidential address to the twenty-fii annual meeting 
of the (American) African Studies Association in 1982, Richard Sklar presented 
fivc variations of democracy in Africa. 
In brief, thc first was liberal demmcy. In this systtm, chctcristic of the 
Rovernment bequeathcci the African a~untries (as for instance, Nigeria) by thc 
colonial administrators, p w c r  was limited by law. and citizns were frec to form 
political associations and to compete for office in opcn clcctions at regular 
intervals? 
The second type of demancy in Africa, contended Sklar, cspmcd thc notion 
that rulers should hc accountable to their subjects, but dismissed the idea of 
multi-party electoral mmpetitim. This form of democracy, hc dubbcd guided 
demtmcy, since the guardians insisted upon political ~miformity.'~ 
The third type of democracy was social democracy which burgconcd from the 
desire hy somc African states to addrw the key h e  of social Justice. It was 
argued that in order to fmhcr social justice, it was imperative for the 
government to promote an egalitarian system, while simultaneomly aumtuating 
the government's accountability to thc pcoplc. Tanzania, under the leadership of 
Julius Nyc~re, excmplifrsd this Conn d democracy." 
The fnzlrth type was what Sklar tcnned participatory democracy, which though 
familiar, remained clusivc. Acccnding to him, the theory of participatory 
democracy assurncd the existence of a relationship between political institutions 
run along democratic lines and participative social institutions.I2 As the 
w e n t  goes, tkse institutions should be able to provide the pedagogical 
lahoratories or milieus fur cducaticm on democratic principles and particiption. 
This line of thinking originates from the assmption that the people spend most 
of their time in the work-place, hence the need to teach democratic ideals in 
these institutions. Zambia, mdcr Kenncth Katmda, illusmtes this experiment in 
actim.13 
Thc fifth variatian was consociatiollill democracy, which might not havc a 
Itgal guardian in Africa, noted SWar, but whi~h has had some allure. Arcnd 
Lijphari described consociational relationship as a mutual comnsus building 
device among diversc elitcs for the purpose of successful govming." Since 
cthni clashes in the politics of who gcts what, when and how havc become 
emlcmic in Africa, with few exceptions, such a system has been considered 
~ ~ t e . ' 5  Sklar argued, though, h t  c~msociarioRalisxn was "a v d u n  of libcral 
democracy with the addition of special mangementr meant to protect the vital 
intern* d cultural 
Thc basis for the above discassion stems from the sometimes voci- ferous 
debates as to whether Nigeria sbouM adopt one d tkse forms of democracy, 
cnncoct an eclectic form, or even impkment a 'no-pa~q"'~ dcmmcy. In spite 
of conflicting opinions, there has always been a general consemus, bowever, tbat 
regardless of its various forms, democracy in Nigeria must take cognbm~ of 
the country's poiitical conditions and cultures. This is a view that Claude Ake has 
eloquently attkulated elsewhere."' Cclcstine Bassey , echoed a somewhat a i a r  
~entheM especially as it concerned the iaue of political stability, which a viable 
democratic practice is intended to establish. He said, "It would ... be a grave 
mistake to ignore the past entirely, since predisposing factors in the political 
process such as belief systems and values (i.e., political culture) are in the main, 
h i i c a l l y  c~nditic~ncd"'~ Larry Diamond contended that if a third endeavor at 
democratic governance was to be stxxxdul, it must design democratic 
institutions to fit Nigeria's unique heritage.= 
Sam Egite Oyovbarc has argued rather confidently tbat, 'We hold the view 
that democracy in Nigeria is not something prior to or above Nigerian politics. 
... It is rather the very sturnof politics."' He sees democracy as a controlled form 
of repsentation. Thus, he described democracy as "a political framework from 
which public plicics emerge and an: administered for socie @...by means of a 
political +a class ideally open to recruitment and exit and assumed to 
possess the c<mfdence (and hence legitimacy] of the entire citizens of the 
political sy~tern."~ 
Sklar himself noted that democracy came in diflerent forms in Africa, and 
bornwing from C. R. D. Halisi, be affirmed that "democracy in Africa was an 
eqefimen~l  process in a new generation of cmm~ics."~ 
The need, &fore, to adopt a suitable genre of demomcy, or an ecktic fw 
of the aforementioned typologies that could become part and parcel of the 
political culture, and mnnned through political socialization is imperative. But 
the adequacy of a democratic system is one thing, however, applying its tenets 
to govern effectively is another. In general, the activities of political parties that 
may he in a position of finthering a democratic culture because of their contacts 
with the grassoots could make or break a system, at least in the Nigeria case. 
Party-system and the T W  Republic 
Tbe history of political Wes in Nigeria is quite intriguing. The function of 
political -ation as forces fa tfre mobilization of the people is indisputable? 
But the purpse for which political parties mobilize their masses could unite or 
disunite a polity; and indeed, they may sometime be dysfunchd to the political 
system in plural societies if inadequately mumred.= For instance, it was such 
a realization that, arguably, prompted the military to enamage a constitutional 
approach in tbe design of the parties prior to tbe Second Republic. In spite of the 
meticulousness, and political engineering, the parties failed to meet the challenge 
of nati~n-buikling.~ What this suggests, -fore, is that it takes mare than rules 
or institutional architecture to create a viable party system. In a real sense, 
"attitudinal" changes or adjustments in the way Nigerians view and practice the 
political game is a sine qua non fw sucwdd governing. Claude Ake chafed 
at the political behavior among Nigerian politicians when he said: "?here is a 
willingness by [political actors] to violate tbe legitimate method of contestation, 
if necessary, to achieve the goal of power ..."27 This attitude tends to result in the 
problem of legitimacy since the losing parties end up with-holding their support 
from the p a t y  in government. It was, however, assumed that these weaknesses 
would be addressed in the party-system of the Thud Republic. 
So, when on May 3, 1989, President Babangida lifted the ban on politics, 
promulgated a "new" constitution, and ordered the politkim to resume partkin 
politics? there was hope that the em of genuinc multi-party democracy had 
finally dawned on the country. Following the president's declaration, Humphrey 
Nwosu, chairman of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), released the 
g a i d e k  for party formatian. In brief the requhanents contained the following 
provisas: 
1. It must be "open to all Nigerian citizensn not bclow the age of 18 
and must be "wellestaMished" in the federal and state capitals, and 
local government areas; 
2. It must state the number of its registered members showing names, 
age and resideatial address of each member to facilitate physical 
coafltmation; 
3. The admhistmtive organization of each political association soeking 
regisbration must be so stmng at dl levels of gmement that it must 
employ "adequate full-time adminisbative pemnnel" such as 
adaMstrative se~ctary, fmaflcial secretary, accountant, auditors, a 
publicity/organizing/weIfare officer and a lilnarian; 
4. A political association must submit to the NEC a statement of its 
assets and liabilities at the time it is applying for regismtion; 
5. A political association must submit together with its constitution a 
H e s t o  which should place "grwiter emphasis on the concrete pm 
blems facing the country" and not on tbeoraid questions, for "one 
cannot govern by theories alane...;" 
6. Application far registration..must be accompanied by receipt of 
N50,OOO paid to NEC..." 
These guidelines, while providing the general framework for party famation 
and character, were jmhMy problematic. In any case, political parties are 
generally collcezned with capturing power than with the nuances of their 
struthlres. 
The Two Party-System 
The AFRC in August 1985, in its inchoate attcmpt to hand over power to a 
civilian rule, set up a 17-member Political Bureau (PB). The Bureau's mandate 
was: I. The review of Nigeria's political history; and 2. Indentifying the basic 
political imbroglios which led to failure m the past awl suggesting ways of 
ameliorating and coping with thcsc complicated problern~.~ Following the 
deliberations, the PB recommended to the AFRC (among other dimensions) that 
thc number of political associations m the country he limited to two in order to 
further a politics based on principles rather than ethni~ity.~' Indeed, thc AFRC 
may have philosophically assumed that since politics in Nigeria bas tended to be 
based on parochial, geographic, religious and ethnic manipulations and interests, 
that the twsparty system would Nut these geeethic  and religious chasms. 
It, nevertheless, affmcd the following as the rationale for a t w e  party 
system: 1. Political associaticms wen: dominated by a few rich individuals; 2. 
Associations wcre interested in serving the'i parochial intcmd instead of tbc 
nation; 3. The proups showed the vuy deficiencies of intolerance and self- 
aggrandizement which b g b t  a b u t  tbt: collapse of earlier expcrhnents in 
democracy; 4. The association paid little attention to the organizational structures 
at the gntsmts l ~ v e l . ~  
Ideologically, Sam Oyovbare (a PI3 member) argued that the tweparty system 
would "set the stage for the gradual clarification of our choice or locus in 
a c c h c e  with the great historical system -i.e., capitalism and socialii !with 
NRC leaning toward capitalism and SDP, social ism.^"^' 
kgwMy, though, what is important in Nigeria's democratic experiment is not 
whethcr it adheres to a t h m c a i  or an ideological paradigm. What is significant 
is the extent to which the parties are determined to function with the rules of the 
political game in thc struggle for power. This has been one of the basic prnblcms 
in the past, a d  may be the ma@ issue in the political pmcess kading to the 
Third Republic and after. 
For exampk, Neal Rcimcr and Douglas W. Simon have hypothesi~d that 
successful patterns for furthering mopration, advancing accommodation and 
handling conflicts in politics requirc: 
1. Agreement on certain constitutional fundamentals. The asumption is 
that such agreements facilitate cn~l~ensus and trust among political 
cleavages. What it inlplies is that political acton must accept the rub 
of the ccmstituticnml game such as voting, freedom of speech, majority 
decision, which should enable participants to "tame" the snm~e(le for 
power. This would make politics less a matter of life and death. 
2. Meaningful oppomities for the expression of needs, interests, and 
d e s i  - i. e., interest articulation. This involves the ability of actors to 
artindate their needs, intmsts and desires through the media and other 
public fora. It is assumed that the existence of opportunities are likely 
to facilitate coc~peration and accommodation that an: required to sustain 
a political system. 
3. Sound mechanisms for the wise selection of priorities - i.e, interest 
aggregation, This implies that political a c m  may build support for 
certain proposals that are generally in their interests while ignoring the 
less important policies. It is assumed that political ac?ors and parties can 
play key mles in huildmg support for priorities that are beneficial for 
the country lirrespective of tbeir party 
4. Acceptable ways of legitimating public policy choim. This involes 
the of citizens to obey the laws, principles, rules, reguIations 
that are made by the legislators and the legal system because they 
confide in the political system. 
5. Effective governance which calls for a govcmment that is capable of 
maintaining law and order, raising the necesiq revenues with which 
to implement its policies effectively ... 
6. Regular and effective mntrols of government. This involves consti- 
tutional devices to ensure that thm tbat arc elected to serve in 
government are servants, and ate not predisposed to using this instru- 
ment of power for tcnorizing its citizens.% 
These: pmises are "enshrined" in the 1979 and 1989 constitutions, and are 
perhaps not unfamiliar to Nigerian lawmakers. But seldom do legislators review 
the constitution (Riven the centrifugal pressures from tbeir constih~encies) after 
an electoral process, to fully imbibe thc political wisdom of its tenets witb which 
to govern effectively. Nigeria has come a long way in its qucst for a durable and 
sustainable demcmcy, and probably an adherenct: to the abve dimensions could 
mean that Nigeriarts may never see the military at the helm of its government. 
Admittally, it was the desire to scc tbat the Third Republic does not mimic the 
previous two republics that led to the designing of an inrmmmtal electoral 
PRXW by the AFRC and the sanctioning of two political partics. 
The Gabcrnatorial (and State Legislative) Elections of 1W1 
A number d factors may have cmspircd to make the primary elections held 
on OLnjbcr 19, 1991, for the state goven#rrs and legislators perplexing. The first 
is the open ballot system which supcrsedd the semt ballot system of previous 
clectim. The open ballot system involves the electorates qucuine, up in front of 
the p'mtrait of the candidate of thcir choice where they would be countd and the 
result announced instantaneously. Although the system was criticid as 
"udemo~atic," it was said to have been relatively successful in the local 
elections of Decembcr 1990:' Thc second major factor was the "exorbitant" fee 
demanded by the political parties on guhatorial aspirants. For example, it was 
reported that close to N5.6 million acaucd from the National Republican 
Convention's (NRC) 1% candidates who paid N25,000 each. The Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), an the orher hand, garnered N2.3 million from its 223 
contcstant~.~ Having bled out this much money, the actors were determioed to 
reap the fruit of their robustb investment in the political fray tbat d 
Eurthermorc, there may have been the assumption that their conml of power and 
the goverm's mansion would provide rhe springbid from which to indulge m 
the politics of "prebendalism." This p i p i t a t s  a third factor which was to win 
at all cost. Although Nigeria is not unique m the inmumentalities of this polit 
tical game, the stmPegiGs and modalities are peculiady Nigerian, as for instance, 
the contentious elections of 1979 and 1983. 
The primaries supervised by the two parties were mtendcd to elect candidates 
to vie for the December 14, gubernatorial election. From every indication, the 
political parties (SDP NRC) ma& a series of faux pas - mistaken steps that 
revived the angst of previous endeavors, aod raked the question as to the 
preparedness of the civilians to accede to power. 
The political climate was so murky that tk NEC bad to intervene. It canceled 
tbe resuits of the October 19, gubernatorial primaries and the subsequent 
Novemhcr run-offs in nine of the thirty states. It also disqualified 12 
conttnversial candidates a d  demanded other primaries in the areas affected by 
Deccmhcr 3, 1991." 
The rationale for the NEC actions mted on the following charges: a. Nan 
availability of membership lists in many voting centers; b. The failure in 
d t a t i o a  as stipulated in the guidelines and as jointly agreed upon by the 
parties and NEC; c. The use of fakc membership lists rather than the list 
submitted to the commission; d Arbitrary aml unauthorized change of venues 
contrary to the pnwisiarrr of approved guidelines; e. Blatant cormption and 
inducement of -, f. Fameation and alteration of results; and g. Refusal to 
give copies of results to NEC.= 
The outcome of this polling exercise was indeed ominous in that those who 
instigated, and &ed out this wanton prac%ce of rigging and other malpractices 
were the " n e w M "  politicians. Ironically, they were cxpecbzd to belong to a 
s@al breed of policians mseduc?ed by the evik of the corrupt plitia of 
"antiquities." Very few, if any, really considered these actors to be political 
virgins. And here lies one of the paradoxes d the transition pmcess. 
And if amupbn bas become endanic and not eradicable, one could amstrue 
from this behavior pattern tbat Nigerian politicians may be suffering from wbat 
Zaki Ergas tenncd "pathological patrim~nialisrn.''~~ Human fallibility and 
occasioaal po1'ical aMHnaties aside, c d d  it be contended tbat these problems 
emanate from the short history d partisan dcmmtic practice in Nigeria since 
i n d e m c e ?  Does the polity need the military to servc as a watchdog and to 
"diaper" the nation's democracy into maturity? 
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, has argued for a dinrchy - i.e., a government made tip 
of civilians and the soldiers as a strategy for avoiding political instability in the 
unmw Resident Babangida, in his opening remark to the annual conference 
of military chiefs on December 9, 199 1, issued a "suMiminal' message, when he 
aszted that "any future political authority to which the miiitary is expected to 
play a subordinate role must itself be democtatic in every sense of the word ... It 
is for this reason tbat there should be no communication gap between our 
politicians and the military."a' 
That mtwirhsmding, following the political imbroglio of the October 
~WIIS, the NEC not only lmderrook the onerous task of supervising tbe nm- 
offs, but also took charge of December 14,1992 states' executive and legislative 
elections. It was assumed that the NEC did a relatively adequate job, albeit, with 
fhe colcssal migbt ad support of military decrees. The mtcomc of the turbulent 
gubematord election was 16 governorships for the NRC and 14 for thc SDP. 
In the legislative branch, the SDP gamed moae seats than did the NRC in the 
30 states. No mattcr bow one viewed the result, it was reasonable to contend that 
the outcome repmented a political equilibrium, which une d d  funha argue 
provided an werall sense of legitimacy. In othea words, the result m t e d  a
variabbsum-game of some sort since it was not extremely lopsided The 
breakdown of the result is rqmmtal in Table 1. 
But the political tussle did not culminate here. Ihe parties construed their 
control of the governor's mansion 8s a likely springboard fmn which to c a p  
the pcsidency-the crown jcwel of the political process. 
Tbe Presidential Election 
The presidential primaries, staggered within the 30 sGttg were scheduled from 
August 1, t h g b  September 5, 1992. Twelve ccmtcstants vied to become the 
flag bearer of the SDP, and eight participated in the political fray to produce a 
leader for the NRC. To be eligible to annpete witbin the SDP, a caudidate would 
have to pay a nomination fee of N500,000 (apptox. $25,000) and N400,000 
(approx. $20,000) for tbe NRCeU 
Whereas this kiud of fee may have been instituted to prevent a mob of 
h n  seeking their party's nomination, it was clear that this stipulation 
made it possible for only tbe wealthy and not wcesri ly the most qualified to 
participate. Indeed, few aspirants would like to lose their "investment" and 
prestige in this; struggie for pcmer. This attitude may have accounttd for ttr 
stultifying political devclopmnt at the pdls. 
The massive rigging and debauchery that accompanied the August primaries 
almost derailed the entire electoral pmcess. Indeed, in thc words of Karl Ma*, 
wbat tbe Nigerian wihessed was t& politics of amm~ytocracy" in whih 
"mcmey, fcrlili.m and even salt, rather tban ideology or campaign platform 
became the hig votc gcttem4j 
Following the failure of the August 1, 1992 primaries, the NEC reschdukd 
primaries for Scvemher 5, 19, a d  22 respectively. The vcxmg issue in Nigerian 
politics is the manner in which the political game is played, and the high 
premium placed on winning. Rigging aside, many false steps were said to have 
been made, and there was enough blame to go arolmd The issue was clear. 
Nigerians were {mly treating the symptoms of the problem and wt the actual 
problem itself -i.e., playing accnrding to the n i l e ~ . ~  
The rescheduied elections of Szpetnber 5,1992, which was claimed to have 
bccn velvety, produced two f m t  m, namely, Oh  Falae for the SDP, and 
Adarnu Ciroma fnr the NRC? It was, however, predicted that the s c d  rmurd 
of primaries whicb was to take place in Anambra, Katsina, Lagos, Bauchi, 
Bcnuc, Akwa Ibom, Kaduoa, Oyo, Rivers and Yobe, was more Iikcly to film 
Shehu Musa YafAdua over his SDP rival Fdae. In the NRC, it would be a neck- 
and-neck battle between Adamu Ciroma and Umaru 
Shinkafi." 
In what was alleged (in spite of the prediction) to be the most cm- troveorial 
e k t h  in Nigerian political history, Shehu Mwsa Y afAdua emerged the winner 
of thc SDP. He polled about 1326,294 votes while his rival Olu Falac polled 
942,278 votes. This placed him ahead of Olu Falae in the two contests within tk 
SDY!' 
For the NEC and the A m ,  in particular, this lafcst blatant malpractice was 
the cwp de grace. The discrepcy mated by the political arithmetic in whicb 
party stalwarts manipulated the results in favor of one candidate over the otba 
was troubling, but not anomalous to Nigerian politics. And this was particularly 
disturbing givcn the watchful eyes of the military (with its power) as the "safety 
valve." If there was any lesson to be learned fiiom this d i i t  development, 
it was that thc road toward democracy m Nigeria was mare tortuous than may 
have been earlier conceived. 
W e  assuring the nation that the tcansiticm to denmmtic govemmce was still 
an course, the AFRC let it he b w n  that its patiewe hadpkrcd nut with the 
flagrant way tbe partics aducted the second rolwl of @mrks. Reacting to tbe 
egregious political malpractices Babangida told the nation that: "The raison d'ctr\: 
of the administration's transition to civil rule program initiated in 1986 ...is that 
Nigerians should makc a clcan break fmm thc maiiljing history of political 
hrinlananship that had k n  her unfixtunate lot hihr to  ... indwd it can bc said 
th t  tk histcry ol' the past seven years had k e n  of an epic battle waged 
~lentlesly by thc f o t m  of change against the cliques and cabals that profited 
inmlemly fm the remgmsive politics which wc scck to  upp plant."^ 
The politics of the First and Secotwl Republics w m  marred by identical 
behavior pttcrns. 7he ehxtoral fraud wis particularly bafiling given the 
painstaking and incremental appxxh taken by the AFRC to avert this endemic 
probkrn and thus usher in an orderly change to civilian mk. In light of these 
dcvelnpnents, howcver, m l d  it he ar@ that the qwst for a sucrxssful 
democratic govanance in Nigeria has attained an unreachable apgec? And if' so, 
why? 
Conclusion 
It may be fmlhardy to endeavor to develop a pmhbilistic theory of politial 
instability in Nigeria as Celestine Hassey has c-4." This was hecausc of 
the inhic.acy and unpredktability of the republic's politics. Despite that, however, 
SIunuel Huntington has arpued that for politi- cal oda and stability to he 
establishd in any polity "tbc creation of political imit~~t icm involving and 
rcfleding the rnml co,nseflsus, mutual interest, principle, tradition, myth, 
prpse, or code of hchavior is a sine qua m n ~ . ' ~  He further cxplaid Nigeria's 
and the emerging nations' plitical difftcultics and instabilities within tbe context 
of institutional theory. In brief, Huntingtcm aflirmcd that the ubiquitousness of 
violence, imgrdarities, and hence political instability in mcldcmidng ~(~ i e t i e s  
(such as Nigeria) was due in put to the 'rapid m b i i n t i m  of new groups into 
politics cmplcd with the slow development of political institutions."s' Put anothcr 
way, "social forces were sump;, political instinnions weak."52 Admittedly, 
Nigeria's political institutions havc'not had longevity which would have allowed 
political actors to adjust through aials and errors to the institutional mechanism 
and dynamism. Further, the "appearance" of the o ~ ~ a l o u s  newbreed politicians 
wboolec) in tht: politics of the previous  publics seemed to have brought 
pmwre to hare om the system bust of conflicting interptaticms of the modus 
operandi of the inchoate institutions. Thus, the debilitating effect caused by tbe 
manipulation of the Mtuti~ms in the aumg attempts of promoting their 
parochial interests may have resulted in the existing political problem and 
instability. 
B. J. Dudley probably epitami7sd one of cbe fundamental c a w  of in- 
stability in Nigeria in his game thec~etical framework. He ontended that the 
issue of im.tability was amibutable to constitutioml impropriety of the elite. He 
argued persuasively that "stability can only be maintained if the behavior of 
Icadership and plitical actors is consistent with the rules d th game or if the 
boumkils detcrminmg rulcs are mq~cted."~' When Baha Gana Kingibe 
(chairman of SDP) a d  Tan Ikimi (NRC d&person) did not condud their 
party's presidential primaries within the rules of the game, the resuh was 
instahlity and natioaal angst. 7?tiq 1 4  to the dissolution of the party leadership 
by the NEC and AFRC and the suhstitu- ticm of these leaders with caretah 
committees for both @es. 
Arguably, the @W msmdhes in Nigeria shnuld not he linked to the lack 
d adequate institutions a l m ,  or in tbe w d  of Huntington, weak iastjtutions. 
The instability in the country tends to be rchted to thc inability and indeed, 
conscious strategy by tbe political actors not to play by th rules of the game, 
because d the belief that if they did, they might he on the losing end. 'ibis was 
so because the political parks did not trust each othca to play according tbe 
established rules. This view is buttmsed by Claude Ake's insightfnl analysis of 
the politics in new states w t m  he afTimned that, "political instability [in Nigeria1 
is explicable in terms of the high pmpensity among political elites to invest in 
the goal of controlling or capturing the reigns of govc~went ."~ In such a 
political milieu, they adhercd to the Machiavellian metaphor, "the end justirks 
the means," in their quest for political power. The strategy, therefore, was to 
exploit some of thxx f k t m  that have become somewhat 'atavistic" in N i e  
politics. Thus, they have applied riggmg, maoetoaxy, and & forms d 
malpractices within their politid repertoire to vie for and control government 
and Regardless d @tical engineering, the ultimate survival of the 
Third Republic may depcd on the willingness of tbe politid ptics and elites 
(military and civilians) to play according to the principles tbey have es$blisbed 
for political competition In partbb, they must adhere to Dudlefs game 
theoretical framework, and d e r n m t e  their belief in c o a s t i ~ i d  sqnmacy. 
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Cmss Rivers 
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E n u p  
I m ,  
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Ksdunr 
&nu 
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Kogi 
Kwan 
Lagos 
Niger 
Ogun 
O d o  
O s b n  
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Plalcau 
Hivea 
Subto 
.Samba 
Yohs? 
FLl'iAbuja - - -- . .-a - - 
Cdvrmer h r l ~  State P a l e d  Fedenl 
As- Semsfe HR 
O g b u a ~ a  OIUJ NRC NRC NRC XRC 
Sale Michika NR(3 NRC NRC NRC 
Obng laemin NRC NRC NRC NRC 
C'huhvu Ezeife SUP SDP SUP SDP 
h h i m  N RC NUC NRC NRC 
Mow Adasu SIX' S W  SDP SDY 
hhim Lawan SDP SDP SDP SDP 
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